The action was reaping criticism, including from President SBY The state will not be outdone by violent behavior. This FPI behavior creates social unrest, tarnishes the dignity of law enforcement and distorts people's understanding as if establishing Islam is synonymous with violence. This triggers the demands of the community about the dissolution of FPI as a radical mass organization that disrupts peace within the community.
FPI's prestige had risen again to exploit the issue of religious blasphemy that dragged Basuki Tjahaja Purnama alias Ahok. The role of Habib Rizieq as FPI leader in the National Movement of MUI Fatwa Defenders (GNPF-MUI) dragged FPI back in "Islamic Defense Action" which was held several times in Jakarta and A number of areas.
The FPI leaders took advantage of the momentum on the stage of anti-sacrilege issues to build popularity and public support. Although in the end some FPI leaders, including Habib Rizieq, had to deal with a number of legal issues such as accusations of blasphemy of Pancasila to nasty chat cases, but it must be admitted that the prestige of Habib Rizieq and FPI has been hoisted thanks to the momentum of religious anti-religious actions.
If the FPI is often identified with violence, HTI is relatively moderate in launching its action. Rally roads, conferences, discussions, and propaganda of social media become HTI's strategy of campaigning on its political views, especially the Caliphate.
HTI propaganda also intensely recapitulates the state system prevailing in Indonesia and disseminates sentiment Anti-West.HTI seems more intense in political issues and garner public support. Therefore, it is not surprising that HTI is able to mobilize thousands of masses in its actions and has the political confidency to publicly challenge the state ideology and authoritative powers with alternative concepts that guide the HTI politics as part of an international political party.
Since the beginning of FPI existence has caused controversy. Although FPI formally stood on August 17, 1998, but various sources say that the activists who founded FPI has been intensified in various religious activities that are considered a threat since the New Order era.
Habib Idrus Jamalullail and KH.CecepBustomi who participated in FPI was once arrested by the New Order in the 1980s. In fact, FPI activists were allegedly involved in a number of violent incidents such as the Ketapang riots of 1998, Pam Swakarsa clashes with people who refused to appoint BJ.Habibie as President to replace Soeharto in SI MPR November 1998. FPI's involvement in Pam Swakarsa itself was suspected as a result of relations between FPI elites and senior military and police officers who supported BJ.Habibie and opposed the 1999 General Assembly of the MPR that rejected BJ.Habibie's accountability.
Conflicting violence and political interests seem to always be inherent in the FPI movement. FPI actively responds to issues that are accompanied by mass mobilization such as issues of pornography, Ahmadiyah, to the issue of night entertainment and gambling. Although it distracts that the movement departs from the marginalization of Muslims, it is difficult to empirically confirm the segmentation of Muslims as FPI's political advocacy object itself. FPI openly also expressed its political stance in reinforcing the Jakarta Charter to fight for the aspirations of the Ummah. As a political entity, FPI seems to be more influenced by the dynamics of political power outside FPI than the encouragement from within the organization. In addition, FPI's political gestures are often drowned due to violence that dominates FPI's preaching.
This lunge puts FPI as well as mass organizations that pose a threat to security and social stability. The story of FPI is reminiscent of a number of studies that examine organized crime that has links with political rulers in some countries.
The existence of Mafia groups is often linked to politicians in Italy and the United States. Cartels are difficult to destroy because they have connectivity in political power in Colombia and Mexico. The mutualism relationships in political patronage between organized crime and politicians make law enforcement ineffective as they will face interference Political power. The study shows a situation that explains the difficult challenge of dissolving FPI in Indonesia.
Meanwhile, HTI in the field is more soft with political packaging of peace and dakwah. HTI developed in Indonesia in the 1980s through da'wah on educated groups in campus. With dakwah, HTI can disguise his character as a political party that pursues political power. No wonder if many people are fooled as if HTI is a social sect or a religious sect.
The HTI is an international movement and a branch of the Hizbut-Tahrir (HT) or Liberation Party declared by Taqiyuddin al-Nabhani in 1953. HT is much hostile in various countries after repeatedly involving in a foil that can be thwarted Such as Jordan in 1969, Egypt, Iraq, Sudan, Tunisia and Algeria in 1973 to establish a government under the Islamic Caliphate of HT.
To form the global Caliphate, HTI or HT adopted three strategies, namely coaching and cadre (marhalah al-tatsqif) to form the core of leadership; Interaction with the ummah (marhalah tafa'ul ma'a al-ummah) to build loyal followers; And the takeover of power (marhalah istilam al-hukm) to change the government. HTT / HTI selectively targets certain groups of people as the basis for political recruitment.
HT's political movements in some countries show how HT makes government employees a target of recruitment and political influence. The Pakistani government suspects HT infiltrated the military between 2003-2013 to recruit members to support the concept of the Khilafah government and overthrow the government.
The military tribunal sentenced him to 18 months and 5 years in prison for Pakistani military officers who proved to be a member of HT. Parvez Musharraf's government banned HT Pakistan in 2003 and dragged it to the HT-led court.
At least 13 Muslim-majority countries have declared HT as a forbidden organization and freeze activities such as Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Uzbekistan, and Bangladesh. The government of Bangladesh bans HT and arrests HT activists for involvement in the killing of bloggers who are considered to support secularism and pro-Westerners. The Chinese and Russian governments also banned HT activities in his country.
In 2015, the Malaysian government captured HT Malaysian leader Abdul Hakim Othman after staging anti-American protests United in Malaysia. The state of Selangor, Malaysia declares that HT as a forbidden organization and that it follows it will deal with applicable law.
The Australian government also prohibits HT because it is considered to spread violence. A number of shootings and hostage actions allegedly involve intense people in HT discussions. In October 2015, a 15-year-old boy who was previously active in HT discussions has been involved in the shooting and murder of law enforcement in Parramatta, Australia. Earlier, Iranian-born Australian, Haron Monis, was involved in the hostage-taking of residents at CafÃ© Lindt Chocolate, Sydney, resulting in the death of two hostages and perpetrators in December 2014.
British intelligence also managed to uncover the HT link with Omar Sharif of Tel Aviv Bar bombing in 2003 after the discovery of HT books at home. Similarly with Jihadi John, a member of ISIS from England who previously actively visited HT discussion during college.
Although HT declared a peaceful carapolitik to achieve its objectives, the various attempted coups and the discovery of the linkage between the perpetrators of terror and HT make it difficult to avoid the fact that HT activities have triggered radicalization and violence. This affirms the statement of Zeyno Baran of the Hudson Institute that HT as a "conveyor belt for terrorist".
The existence of FPI and HTI has posed a potential threat to Indonesia's national interests, both because of its teachings and its political movements.
Therefore, it is necessary to take firm action against the two organizations. 17 of 2013 on Social Organizations, where article 59 states that CSOs are prohibited from hostile actions against tribes, religions, races and classes, and prohibitions on acts of violence that disturb public order, including vandalism.
The mass organization law also provides for sanctions ranging from written administrative warnings to dissolution as provided for in articles 60 to 82. Gradually sanctions include administrative sanctions, termination of funds, prohibition of activities, to the removal of legal entity status bodies upon approval of the courts.
Mechanism in the Ordinance Act No. 17 of 2013 is complicated, both stages and coordination between agencies involving the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Prosecutor, the Supreme Court, Kemenkumham, and the judicial process. However, the law must be effectively enforced in order to make a deterrent effect for CSOs.
The weakness in the Community Ordinance which is now about to be revised should not be an obstacle for the government to take action to protect the community from threats arising from mass organizations of perpetrators. Publishes a new policy to regulate law enforcement against illegal groups as organized activities in the sense of organized crime concept commonly used by the state against modern forms of crime.
Meanwhile, the existence of HTI should be affirmed in the legal system applicable in Indonesia. UU political parties do not recognize foreign party branches that may be established and operate in the jurisdiction of Indonesia. HTI also not included in the category of CBOs known in the Ordinance Act in Indonesia.
Therefore, there is no juridical basis for the existence of HTI in Indonesia and thus can be expressed as an Unformed Organization that carries out foreign interests and disseminates political ideas that are contrary to the prevailing state ideology and constitution in Indonesia.
HTI's blatant statement as the HT branch of the Chinese-operated branch of the party to establish the Caliphate in Indonesia is clearly an aggression against Indonesian sovereignty and can be interpreted as a subversive activity against the state that is against the law.
The government should not doubt the legal basis for declaring HTI as a forbidden organization and proclaiming its teachings as a forbidden teaching that followers and disseminations of teachings may be subject to prosecution before the law.
Sooner or later, HTI has the potential to become a factual problem in the community as shown in the experience of various countries, either because of the violence implied from its campaign activities or because of the infiltration within the government to support the chances of a coup to apply the Caliphate system.
Currently HTI may still be in motion Moderate, but if HTI succeeds in raising broad public support and recruiting potential cadres in government then moderation can easily become an extreme form that endangers the existence of NKRI.
*) The author is a researcher at the Center of Risk Strategic Intelligence Assessment (Cersia), Jakarta.